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INTRODuCTION
The problem of “where” has taken on a great deal of importance 
following the global phenomena which have forced legal scholars to reconsider 
the question of space. In Europe and the United States, constitutionalism is 
established according to two different cultures of constitutional changes. On one 
hand, the European context is marked by the tension between Constitution/State 
* A previous version of this article was published on the Italian law review, Eunomia. Rivista semestrale del 
Corso di Laurea in Scienze Politiche e delle Relazioni Internazionali, Eunomia II n.s. (2013), n. 1, 195-218.
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and politics (the best example of which being the German Weimar Republic); 
on the other hand, with the new Nomos of the Earth (20th century), dominated 
by American international doctrines of interference on a global level, politics 
takes hold of the economy to identify itself with it and give life to the principle of 
cujus oeconomia, ejus regio. European States stop being exclusively guided by 
political interest of intrastate power (the Nomos of the Earth) to take an interest 
in governing the change of social structures. Mirkine-Guetzevitch spoke about a 
European «general constitutional law» founded on the rationalization of power 
to respond to society’s needs and the transformational requirements of rights 
(in a social dimension and no longer in an economic-individual dimension), 
in accord with an international public law of reciprocal respect between the 
States1.
In actual fact, the logic of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio follows the 
expansion of the American Nomos of the Earth in its different directions 
compared to the jus publicum europeaeum. The global context is characterized 
by moments of transformation, for example the process of European integration 
and the “constitutional” role of European judicial decisions and international 
cases of the ECHR. European culture entrenches itself behind the law against 
“informal” changes, negating validity to phenomena which are placed extra 
constitutionem. In this picture we include both attempts at constitutional reform 
which are constitutionally unfaithful and political tendencies in fraud of the 
Constitution; so that, if the legal and political systems begin to use the same 
g, decisions are made within the bounds of political correctness but outside 
the correct constitutional structure. But, every Constitution is text and context 
at the same time, a space within which gaps need to be filled by means of 
revision which respond to a recognized and common code. The complexity 
of the relationship comes from the search for harmony between the time of 
the Constitution and that of society in consideration of the fact that the 
judges, interpreting the Constitution, intervene as intermediaries in a dialogue 
which needs to be open in order to be democratic. The interpretation of the 
Constitution as a public process becomes the main vehicle of innovation of 
the constitution2. The Constitution as a written text and society determined by 
cultural pluralism are the main players in the problematic relationship wherein 
a judge feels the necessity to open up the constitutional text to the context in 
periods of crisis in the community. In opening itself to the social context, the 
Constitution is inevitably subject to time, and its written text guarantees stability 
and certainty on one hand, but exposes it to various interpretations on the other 
hand. In the temporal dimension, the Constitution is destined to change, at 
times leaving the text intact from which certain concepts can be interpreted in 
different ways; other times, intervening and revising it with respect to formal 
1 See B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH, Le costituzioni europee, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1954.
2 J. LUTHER, La Scienza häberliana delle costituzioni, in Analisi e diritto, 2001.
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procedure and the fundamental core remains unchanged in time. Sometimes its 
content is modified in order to satisfy the interests of a political class, a social 
group or a European impulse. An example of this is the Italian context because 
in Italy, constitutional law n. 1 of 20 April 2012 amended Article 81 of the 
Constitution, introducing the so-called “balanced budget”3. This new “rule” was 
introduced in accordance with the Fiscal compact, to the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, ratified 
in Italy with law n. 114 of 23 July 2012. Article. 3, paragraph 2 of the Treaty 
declares: “The rules set out in paragraph 14 shall take effect in the national law 
of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this 
Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably 
constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to 
throughout the national budgetary processes”. The mentioned article considers 
the “constitutionalization” of the bond “preferable”, as a guarantee of stability 
and durability of the economic-political choices; this constitutionalization is 
therefore taken as a guarantee of financial stability. Following the amendment 
of Art. 81, those constitutional constraints called “reserves of justice”, should 
have been introduced into the constitution, but in fact were not. These reserves 
of justice would represent a percentage which could not be touched by political 
majorities and would be aimed at guaranteeing a minimum standard of living 
and managing social rights, which would remain and would continue to be 
fundamental5.
National government, with its political power, should be the determining 
force both in terms of strength and party strategy, and in terms of “pouvoir 
3 A.S. BRUNO, L’ipotesi italiana della costituzionalizzazione dell’ “equità intergenerazionale” nel confronto 
col diritto costituzionale del Brasile, in G.M. POMPEU; M. CARDUCCI; M.R. SÁNCHEZ (eds.), Direito 
Constitucional nas Relações Econômicas: entre o crescimento econômico e o desenvolvimento humano), 
LumenJurís, Rio de Janeiro, 2014.
4 The Contracting Parties shall apply the rules set out in this paragraph in addition and without prejudice to their 
obligations under European Union law: (a) the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting 
Party shall be balanced or in surplus; (b) the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual 
structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective, as defined in 
the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0,5% of the gross domestic 
product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective 
medium-term objective. The time-frame for such convergence will be proposed by the European Commission 
taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-
term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a 
reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the revised 
Stability and Growth Pact; the Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their respective medium-
term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances, as defined in point (b) of 
paragraph 3; (d) where the ratio of the general government debt to gross domestic product at market prices 
is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the 
lower limit of the medium-term objective specified under point (b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 
1,0 % of the gross domestic product at market prices; (e) in the event of significant observed deviations from 
the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered 
automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement 
measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.
5 O’ GORMAN, R., ECHR, the EU and the Weakness of Social Rights Protection at the European Level, in 
German Law Journal, vol. 22, n. 10, 2011, p. 1833 ss.
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constituant” with regard to a Constitution which is fighting to assert and protect 
its identity. The necessity for the constitutional text to open up to the “evolution” 
of society is useful to identify new cultural equilibrium through “indicators of 
predictability” provided by dialogue and negotiation between individuals and 
groups who participate in the decision making process. In this way, the text is 
adapted to its context, constructing the basis of what has been defined as a “time 
in history” and what is therefore a “time of the Constitution” since it determines 
“content and objectives”. In the recent governmental changes (liberalization, 
marketization, globalization) “an increasing range of public life is being 
subjected to the discipline of the norms of liberal-legal constitutionalism [...] 
the norms of right conduct prescribed in these texts acquire their authority from 
precepts of reason rather than approval of “the people”. It is the authority of these 
norms that is being asserted and these norms acquire the status of fundamental 
law not because they have been authorized by a people but because of the 
self-evident rationality of their claims”6. The ideal dialogue is between its 
unchanging elements and the structure which allows it to function, that is, its 
practical application according to the specific moment in time. In this way, the 
Constitution is both objective and subjective at the same time.
The article develops the following questions in three sections. In the first 
part, I underline how national law has lost its normative force as a symbol of 
positive legal order: with the process of globalization, it has been overtaken by 
a law whose origin is in the public opinion of members of society, in judges’ 
decisions and in judicial science. In the second paragraph, I will focus on the role 
of the new techno-economical space which has eradicated the original Nomos 
which marked the link between a social community and its territory to indicate 
the beginning of a new configuration of the relationship between economy 
and politics. Finally, I support the thesis in which the State must intervene in 
regulating and constitutionalizing the global market, otherwise, along with the 
social counter-power of other spheres (NGO, media, trade unions etc.) it can 
have an effect on the economy, generating rules of self-limitation in order to 
preserve itself.
1 ThE COMMuNITARIzATION Of DOMESTIC LAW ThROuGh ARTIfICIAL TOOLS
From the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty and the Charter of 
Rights, the phases of evolution of European constitutionalism have generated 
among member States an awareness that the “Constitution” of the European 
Union would never be a “document” created by one single constituent 
power but something different to the classical Constitution in the Kelsenian 
sense; something that was being structured as a “process” through which 
6 M. LOUGHLIN, What is Constitutionalisation?, in P. DOBNER; M. LOUGHLIN (eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
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to acknowledge the empirical legitimacy of the “Constitution” even after 
the consolidation of its formal authority. Confirmation of this is given in the 
constitutional architecture which, currently, does not appear to have been 
validated by any formal procedure of adoption by a constitutional demos7. 
The absence of a Grundnorm (Fundamental Law), as an incomplete moment 
of European integrity-integration, has caused multiple consequences both 
internally and externally, both on a European level and a global level. On one 
hand, this has led to national demands for definition of collective identity: the 
lack of a common code (in which every individual can identify himself, as this 
code has been created by everyone) and the consolidation of a supranational 
public power has caused reactions of delimitation of power among the member 
States, opposing the protection of fundamental rights and national identity to 
it in order to preserve the constitutional specificity. On the other hand, the 
individual, through European legislation, has been emancipated from national 
restrictions to the point of becoming one of the main pivotal of the European 
legal system, bringing about a multilevel judicial constitutional law, a multilevel 
protection which has broadened the space of intervention of judges in giving 
greater clarity to the indeterminate nature of precepts. With the process of 
globalization, national law has lost its normative force as a symbol of positive 
legal order. It has been overtaken by a law whose origin is in the public opinion 
of members of society, in judges’ decisions and in legal science8.
The legislators’ intentions have been substituted by those of the judges, 
allowing human rights, fundamental individual rights – in the most modern sense 
of the term – to produce institutional and judicial artifices to effectively safeguard 
“individualism”, in and of globalization against the abuse of the majority. In this 
sense, a denationalization of the States has followed the creation of the global 
juridical dimension. The States, with the choice of giving way to judges, have 
legitimized a dialogue which, in recent years, has involved national courts, the 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. This has in part led 
to the communitarization of domestic law through shared values and spaces9, 
and subsequently, to the increased flexibility of State powers; in part it has also 
led to the creation of a soft law10, a law which is not binding in its legal strength 
but sufficiently strong in its programmatic structure to represent a break from 
traditional laws which have become too rigid for the logic behind European 
Union governments, and instrumental in steering capitalism and “technique”.
7 See J.H.H. WEILER, Federalismo e costituzionalismo: il «Sonderweg» europeo, in G. ZAGREBELSKY (ed.), 
Diritti e Costituzione nell’Unione Europea, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2003, p. 22.
8 See G. FASSÒ, Storia della filosofia del diritto, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001, p. 197.
9 See V. PICCONE, L’«internazionalizzazione» dei diritti umani, in G. BRONZINI – F. GUARRIELLO – V. 
PICCONE, (eds.), Le scommesse dell’Europa, Roma, Ediesse, 2009, p. 22.
10 See G. AZZARITI, Brevi notazioni sulle trasformazioni del diritto costituzionale e sulle sorti del diritto del 
lavoro in Europa, ibid., p. 139.
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The processes of internationalization have put national legal systems up 
against the same structural problems, producing forms of convergence in the 
search for solutions that, while different, can be considered “equivalent” in the 
functional sense. If we consider the European Treaties, it is clear that after the 
creation of a space without frontiers, a process of “delocalization” and “de-
historicization” followed, after which individuals experienced the gap between 
being an “individual-member” of a political and legal institution and an 
“individual-member” of the economic space, that is, an active and passive part 
of the new economic assets. The effect on global society was also the division 
into sectors according to functions, a mass of global cultures, a vast amount of 
social systems which allow only single fragmented ties.
Each of us feels as if we belong to two spatial orders: the concrete places of 
our origin, our homeland, small or large, mutual exchanges influenced by State 
borders; on the other hand, the “system of universal dependence”, the global 
extents of constitutional “technique” and economy, telematic communication, 
silent and objective markets. We come and go between places and non – places, 
between terrestrial positions and pure spaces. Our identity is split between civis 
and homo oeconomicus, between obedience to the laws of the city and the 
laws of global space11. Throughout time the relationship between the individual 
and society has never been static because it is built around and through two 
protagonists which are neither isolated nor immobile. In order to interact 
with society an individual has to look out on the world and open himself to 
it. The world welcomes him and shows itself to have a wealth of definitions, 
a whole system of attitudes, an ever active patrimony of ways of operating12. 
Consequently, the individual is conditioned by his being in the world, in his 
being a product of his own particular time which becomes entwined with the 
time of the society in which he is operating. The aims which a society intends to 
pursue become an integral part of a “continuous flow of events” of which that 
continuum of deeds done by the individual becomes a part. This is the origin 
of social and juridical pluralism, by which, ever new instances and events refer 
back to constitutionally safeguarded values which are waiting to be realized, 
while the certainty of the law is continually undermined, never completely 
made concrete. Although the law is expected to guarantee juridical safety it 
cannot in the long run avoid, as it evolves, creating something “new” bringing a 
social harmony founded on a balance between stability and change. A continual 
evolution and controlled transformation can be envisaged where the function of 
the law is not decided exclusively by an analysis of the equilibrium of the system 
but instead, takes into account upheavals, irregularities and states of transition. 
11 See N. IRTI, Norma e luoghi. Problemi di geo-diritto, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001, p. 80.
12 See G. CAPOGRASSI, Analisi dell’esperienza comune, Milano, Giuffrè, 1975.
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It could be said that it is a time of “metamorphosis”, founded on the gradual 
change of a system whose identity has to remain unaltered13.
The Constitution needs to be aware of social change, new conflicts, 
the continuing need for new solutions and interpretations, and institutional 
requirements for abstract and general rules in order to achieve certainty in the 
law and for the law. On the other hand, the Constitution needs to evaluate the 
real possibilities for resolving controversy and preserving its fundamental values.
The fundamental principles are the tool which the Constitution uses to 
resolve controversy, considering that these to be such, and therefore, effective 
(as the base of social and legal order which remains faithful to its original matrix, 
while constantly renewing itself), must be witness to a present which does not 
repudiate its history, or rather, a history which extends seamlessly into the 
present: being and becoming a time. For this reason, these principles carry out 
a function that is both conservative and promotional, maintaining the original 
values, (of which they are an imperfect translation) and at the same time opening 
up to new developments14.
It is well known that Europe has always sought in the law the tool of 
unification so as not to yield to the individualist temptation of overseas case 
law and to maintain the culture of common law and civil law separate in 
respect for their different historical origins15; but the passage of one “rule” 
from one legal order (supranational) to another (national) has put an end to the 
original significance of the rule and the necessary re-elaboration of the same 
in consideration of the new socio-legal context. This artificial relationship that 
has arisen between the two systems has given way to something that could be 
assimilated in a new legal formant, a «legal irritant», to quote Gunther Teubner, 
allowing the inclusion of a “rule” from one context to another by using techniques 
of adaptation (e.g. constitutionally conforming interpretation or Drittwirkung) or 
inexorably evolving dynamics that expose the internal context to changes (e.g. 
community or international judicial living law).
Consequently, the main dilemma seems not only to be the inadequacy 
of the law in incorporating the external rule in the national territory: after all, 
in the past, positivism bent to procedural rules and the Kelsenian Grundnorm, 
which claimed to explain the validity of any system, in fact, based all the States 
on the “rule of law”, to then reveal itself as an empty container, suitable for the 
inclusion of any content but determining several problems of transformation of 
13 See F. OST, Le temps du droit, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1999.
14 See A. RUGGERI, L’identità costituzionale alla prova: i principi fondamentali fra revisioni costituzionali 
polisemiche e interpretazioni-applicazioni «ragionevoli», in «Ars Interpretandi. Rivista di ermeneutica 
giuridica», 1996, pp. 113-129.
15 G. TEUBNER, “Legal Irritants”: come l’unificazione del diritto dà luogo a nuove divergenze, in «Ars 
Interpretandi. Rivista di ermeneutica giuridica», 2006, p. 156.
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meaning and role of the accepted term. In Italy, uniformity of the court decisions 
comes by means of living law, meaning the settled interpretation of the higher 
courts and successive adaptation by the lower courts. Artificiality, absolute un-
naturality, is the foremost trait of modern law, or rather, of legal modernity. After 
breaking with natural law and every binding foundation, political and legal will 
can receive any content, adopt any rule. Laws are artificial, indifferent to their 
content, able to determine their own time and space. Enactment of these laws 
is mere formality: it is just procedure, and procedure becomes the basis of the 
law. Such artificiality allows the law to detach itself from its place of origin and 
to be extended as an agreement between States, to any number of territories16. 
The current dilemma concerns the division between cultural polycentrism and 
functional differentiation which has led the national territory to be part of the 
worldwide framework and thus the national law detached from its culture of 
origin17. For this reason, Teubner’s «legal irritants» irritate the links of law to 
society. Foreign laws are irritating not only in relation to the national legal 
situation itself but also in relation to the social situation to which the law is 
closely linked in certain circumstances. As legal irritants, they force the specific 
episteme of national law to a reconstruction in the network of its distinctions. As 
social irritants, they lead the social discourse to which the law is closely bound 
to a reconstruction of itself. In this way, they give way to two different series of 
events whose interaction leads to an evolving dynamic that could find a new 
balance in the self-value of the situation involved. Such a complex and unstable 
process rarely leads to the convergence of the legal systems in question, but 
rather to the creation of new gaps in the relationship between operationally 
close social systems.
This founding relationship of recontextualizations both in a legal and 
social sense, as Teubner writes, cannot be considered the creator of a new 
institutional identity for unilateral determination (or rather, for legal transfer), 
nor can it reduce itself to the causal dependence between independent and 
dependent variables, or a relationship between an economic base and a legal 
supra-structure. Rather, it is a symbolic space of compatibility of different 
meanings that allows different possible results18.
2 STATE SOVEREIGNTy V. POPuLAR SOVEREIGNTy
The importance to replace the Constitution in a spatial dimension 
which takes into account the abolition of frontiers will allow the final board 
of coordinates so that constitutional laws do not become lost in existential 
16 See N. IRTI, Il carattere politico-giuridico del mercato, in Rassegna economica, LXVIII, 2, 2004, p. 1.
17 See N. LUHMANN, The Paradoxy of Observing Systems, in «Cultural Critique», 31, The Politics of Systems 
and Environments, Part II, Autumn 1995, p. 37.
18 See G. TEUBNER, Legal Irritants, cit., p. 169.
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ontologism, whose futile result is the same as all the a-historical conceptions of 
subjectivity, well expressed in Heidegger’s human Dasein, in Jaspers’ confused 
historic conscience or in Gadamer’s labyrinthine hermeneutic historicity19. To 
depend solely on temporality to give continuity to the Constitution and identify 
its application with an act of faith in an “open” Constitution that reveals a 
mythical nature means to expose the Constitution to attacks and manipulations, 
because no barriers have been created which can define and realize the spatial 
dimensions of the Constitution (and the State). The eradication of constituent 
power signifies the lack of a precise moment in time in which a pluralist society 
chooses to organize itself according to a set of rules and principles to “rely on” 
and recognize a “writing degree zero” from which to derive the history of the 
new Nomos of the Earth. The opening of “economic globalization”, in the era 
of cosmopolitanism and internationalization, has brought about a defenceless, 
neutral State, not only as welfare state, but also as a political entity and binding 
form of organized cohabitation20.
The intermediate function carried out by the same State at a supranational 
level between the European Union and the national system, in order to guarantee 
stability and legitimacy of the process of social integration is, however, decisive 
in the safeguarding of constitutional guarantees that risk being evaded by 
European economic policies. The strength of Europe lies in the institutions 
which represent it and in the political processes determined by “regularity” of 
integration. What emerges from the phase of transition that has involved all 
member States towards the unification of Europe is a process of transformation 
realized in its “applicational level” and not only in the phase of «enactment 
of formal legislation»21. The logic of the market and the representative State 
support the unstoppable and detailed enactment of European legislation in 
which the determination of the aim is essentially the «fundamental political 
decision», normatively consolidated, therefore all political acts are instrumental 
in the phase of implementation of the Union’s goals. These acts, differentiated 
by name, type, value and legal force do not take into account any form of 
responsibility and control of political trends – due to a lack of suitable methods 
of implementing liability and the lack of a liable body which can regulate 
political power22. These acts do not express any determining authority of the 
aims of the Union: the opening towards “impersonal” logic (the universality 
of human rights is the clearest example of this, both for the unconditional 
nature of the theme, and for the risk of it becoming merely a constitutional 
19 See P. DE VEGA GARCIA, Mondializzazione e diritto costituzionale: la crisi del principio democratico nel 
costituzionalismo attuale, in Diritto pubblico, VII, 3, 2001, p. 1087.
20 See ibid., p. 1091.
21 M. CARDUCCI, Il problema esplicativo delle trasformazioni costituzionali. Appunti per una comparazione 
di teorie e prassi, in A. SPADARO, (ed.), Le «trasformazioni» costituzionali nell’età della transizione, Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2000, p. 162.
22 See G. FERRARA, L’indirizzo politico dalla nazionalità all’apolidia, available at http://www.astrid-online.it.
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“symbol”) has started a process of universalization of the content of western 
constitutionalism (democracy, delegation, values, equality) which in reality 
clashes with the primary social levels (race, religion, language) that seem to 
prevail over functional roles imposed by law23. The political trend which on a 
global scale have been consolidated in institutions, in the long term risks being 
exhausted by the regularity of politics functioning without law; it continues to 
be denationalized to the point of becoming stateless due to something that has 
always been able to cross borders, more or less legally, but surely efficiently: 
money, which in turn has always had much to do with State sovereignty but 
never with popular sovereignty24.
The creation of new alternative spaces to national space, determined both 
by processes that respond to transnational power and processes that operate 
outside institutionalized political power, can appear physiological in global 
logic, but it shows the absence (or non-activation) of a set of tools with which to 
generate “antibodies” against external attacks brought about by new situations 
and the subsequent artificiality of the relationship between the two dimensions 
(national and supranational).
Artificiality of law goes hand in hand with global techno-economy and 
therefore in identifying its essence, it can be placed either opposite it as an 
enemy or beside it as an ally. The eradication of law, the fall of the ancient 
Nomos, the ability to determine times and spaces of application: only these 
factors permit it to be on the same level of the techno-economy. Through 
agreements between States and therefore with artificial tools, the law is able to 
embrace, either entirely or partially, the planetary economy.
The new techno-economical space has eradicated the original Nomos 
which marked the link between a social community and its territory to indica-
te the beginning of a new configuration of the relationship between economy 
and politics. This process of reconfiguration, having in legal “technique” the 
most suitable tool and the natural environment with and in which to develop, 
must overcome the constitutional problems of transnational regimes in which 
the structural aspect, determined by constitutional rules, which give rationality 
to the system, has already been created. It is raising consciousness that the pro-
cess of European integration, European judicial acts and International decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights are not a product of the historical con-
flict between law and politics but the results of new mechanisms: or technical 
structuring (like European Governance, which seems to be a “tacit revision” 
of national Constitutions or “anesthesia” of their normative power) or jurispru-
dential structuring (with the decisions of the Court of Justice or the European 
Court of Human Rights in Europe, and especially the Inter-American Court of 
23 See M. CARDUCCI, Il problema esplicativo delle trasformazioni costituzionali, cit., p. 166.
24 N. IRTI, Norma e luoghi, cit.
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Human Rights in Latin America, where the interpretation of the Inter-American 
Convention are imposed on or condition the national interpretations of judges, 
becoming a heteronomous factor of informal modification compared to the con-
tradictory national constitutional results)25. The global picture determined by 
economic power, which crosses territorial confines according to market logic 
and world trade, shows how State law struggles to provide the suitable concep-
tual tools for forming institutions capable of distinguish, if not managing, State 
sovereignty and free supranational economy26.
3 ThE SuPRANATIONAL “LEGAL fORMANTS” AND ThE PROCESS Of “hyBRIDIzATION”
But the process of European integration is involved in more widespread 
phenomena of constitutional inter-connection which does not always respond 
to the logic of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio. Alongside the well known 
phenomenon of the relationship between international public law and State 
law, is the new dynamic recently named “transconstitutionalism”. In particular 
between international law for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
constitutional laws (e.g. ECHR and Constitutions); supranational law and State 
laws (e.g. EU); State law and transnational organizations (e.g. WTO); national 
systems and local extra-State systems (e.g. indigenous law); supranational law 
and international law (e.g. ECHR and EU). Therefore, the connection, being 
no longer intrastate, becomes characterized by contexts of different places and 
subjects – public or private – leading to the assertion of what has been defined 
«polycontextural law». Can «polycontextural law» destructure the unilateralism 
of the American Nomos? Can polycontextural law favour the reciprocity of 
intrastate standards?27
Furthermore, the management of the global dimension itself – whether it is 
considered trans-constitutional or polycontextural – is not necessarily subjected 
to the logic of cujus oeconomia, ejus regio, but it is entrusted to the States, 
to interstate agreements (according to the original project through which the 
European Union was decided by the same States in full implementation of their 
sovereignty). It is evident that the current scenario presents a severance between 
territory and space, that is, between State sovereignty and the (supranational) 
dimension of the economy, between “where” and “everywhere”. The “where” 
of law could be “everywhere”: anywhere that has been agreed upon by interstate 
pacts. We discover in this way the great virtue of artificiality, which may not be 
of any place but can be in any place, and can therefore give a terrestrial base 
to global phenomena. It does not obey any Nomos, which would joined it to 
25 See M. CARDUCCI, Dal Nomos della terra del diritto costituzionale occidentale al trans costituzionalismo 
policontesturale, lecture in Comparative Public Law at the University of Bari (Italy), May 7, 2010.
26 See C. SCHMITT, Il Nomos della terra, Milano, Adelphi, 1991, p. 301.
27 See M. CARDUCCI, Dal Nomos della terra del diritto costituzionale occidentale al trans costituzionalismo 
policontesturale, cit.
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the individuality of a place, but merely answers the need for more precise and 
effective functionality28. If the response to a «catastrophe contingency», ever 
more acute in the current financial crisis, can only come from within the State, 
then the State must intervene in regulating and constitutionalizing the global 
market, otherwise, along with the social counter-power of other spheres (NGO, 
media, trade unions etc.) it can have an effect on the economy, generating «self-
controlling impulses» through rules of self-limitation29.
These rules of self-discipline are not inherent to every system but 
represent that «clamping lever» of the system against internal risks and external 
attacks: this is the distinction between structural and functional Constitution, 
both relating to the necessary content of a “Fundamental Law”. Structural/
Kelsenian Constitution represents the sources of producing law that guarantees 
the rationality of the system, while functional Constitution differs from structural 
Constitution in that it does not belong necessary to any system, it comprises 
all limitative rules which impede self-damage of the system by driving out any 
such tendencies. The Constitution will be ultimately tested when appealing to 
those limitative rules when faced with a challenge – almost a circuit breaker 
when faced with a blackout. These rules will protect the Constitution from 
destructive and self-destructive attacks only if political forces can guarantee the 
effectiveness of these rules.
Mediation of political will permit the States to construct their own 
sovereignty by translating the responsibility of decisions into laws. At the 
same time, political choices are as ever the real creators of economic spaces 
and the economy is formed around state rules and laws. Therefore, on one 
hand, the crisis of normativity is cause and effect of the creation of contra or 
extra constitutionem rules which are legitimate because they conform to an 
evolutional process which recognizes the EU as the ideal space in which to 
embrace the challenges of globalization: a «process of positivization» that is 
modulated around a «series of operations of recognition and identification», or 
rather, a continuing and widespread hermeneutic practice of acceptance and 
use, articulated over all levels, from “technical” levels, recognized by the same 
system, to non-institutionalized levels of private citizens, who experience the 
law as valid and favour it over other possibilities. On the other hand, there is 
the affirmation of a new aequitas in the “figurative” path of modern subject, 
summoned to reclaim the past in order to preserve it and support it in the future.
«The process of European integration presents many challenges to the 
member States. The ECHR is an international treaty with a Fundamental Rights 
Charter and the national constitutions consider it as an essential parameter for 
28 See N. IRTI, Norma e luoghi, cit., pp. 76-77.
29 M. DOGLIANI, Costituzione in senso formale, materiale, strutturale e funzionale: a proposito di una riflessione di 
Gunther Teubner sulle tendenze autodistruttive dei sistemi sociali, available at http://www.costituzionalismo.it.
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their jurisprudence. National constitutional jurisprudence is to be in conformity 
with Strasbourg jurisprudence: this kind of approach allows fundamental 
rights to have two sides of the same identity, one is handled by the national 
constitution, and the other one by the ECHR. In this context a frequent question 
is what the mechanism to link the ECHR to the national constitutional orders is: 
being a formal part of the national constitutional order as in Austria (the most far-
reaching solution); being the essential criteria for the interpretation of internal 
fundamental rights as in Spain (Constitution Art. 10.2); being a normative layer 
between ordinary legislation and the Constitution as in France and the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe; or, being equal to ordinary laws 
such as, for example, in Germany»30.
But the Lisbon Treaty did not only succeed in combining two notions, 
“constitutional traditions” and “general principles”, simplifying the long debate 
which had involved both notions; it also appears to have given the European 
Court of Human Rights a new legal status in the system of sources of law, thus 
benefiting from a role of primauté over national law. The decision of the Italian 
Consiglio di Stato (Council of State)31 no. 1220 of 2 March 2010 on this topic 
does not limit the sphere of Community law, object of direct application, as if 
it could ignore the controversial matter and above all, ignore the deficiency of 
national legislation in resolving the question at hand.32
Often Italian decisions has appealed to the principles of the ECHR, 
highlighting the exceptional necessity to disapply the national law in order to 
guarantee minimum rights to the individual or to apply the judicial decisions of 
the Strasbourg Court; or to produce a “community aimed” result; as the Court 
of Strasbourg encouraged to respect article 35 of the ECHR which permits an 
appeal to the judge of the Convention only after exhausting internal legal paths, 
even though the national judge must interpret the State legal tools in a manner 
conforming to the Convention.
However, in this particular case, the judge opted for the principle of full 
and direct application of the ECHR, without disapplying specific internal laws 
contrasting with the Convention. Fully respecting constitutional guarantees of 
legality and motivation of judgments (art 97 and 111 Italian Const.), the Council 
30 A. RAINER, The Emergence of European Constitutional Law, available at http://www.ejcl.org. The global 
dimension of these problems brings with it a new law of spaces which can no longer provide answers relevant 
to historical continuity and logical unity typical of European law, but which will permit various, defined and 
efficient solutions. An interesting example of this is article 6 of the TEU: «Fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of 
the Union’s law»; See «Official Journal of the European Union», March 30, 2010, available at http://eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF.
31 It is the Supreme Court in the hierarchy of administrative courts.
32 28 See G. COLAVITTI – C. PAGOTTO, Il Consiglio di Stato applica direttamente le norme CEDU grazie al 
Trattato di Lisbona: l’inizio di un nuovo percorso? Nota a Consiglio di Stato, sent. 2 marzo 2010, n. 1220, 
available at http://associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it.
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of State wanted to motivate the logical legal iter of the choice to disapply the 
national law, in order to ensure the prevalence of a fundamental human right 
safeguarded by the ECHR. For years constitutional decisions has swayed between 
trying to safeguard the national Nomos, favouring the territorial element, and 
practical remedies which, with the support of interpretational activity, opted 
for solutions which were more “effective” than respectful of the hierarchy of 
sources of law.
The modern State is characterized by its being fully rooted in a process of 
globalization that, under the influence of a multitude of forces and trends, has 
undermined its own forms and limits that were, until some time ago, evolutive 
“acquisitions” of a constitutional democracy and, as such, of a common 
heritage. The absence of democratic constitutionalism denounced by scholars 
are particularly evident in the process of disintegration of the welfare state, 
where social rights are so evanescent as to weaken the very foundations of 
democracy33. Indeed, the constitutional state is characterized, on the one hand, 
by an unstructured sovereignty and the weakness of the social state; and on the 
other hand, by a reduced power to control economy. This last characteristic has 
deprived political parties and trade unions, as well as national parliaments, of 
the ability to manage the economic growth through which operate (as the main 
characteristic of the rule of law) the appropriate balancing with the founding 
values of a constitutional state. In this framework, the political crisis has 
emerged as a crisis of relations and interactions between actors and institutions 
of representation, and therefore as a crisis of what could be the heart of a 
model of participatory democracy34. Last but not least, the judicial function has 
contributed to the destabilization of the constitution, at least as a constitutional 
model of the European historical experience. The judiciary power seems to be 
transformed into a guarantee of the last claim, with the role of mediator in socio- 
cultural conflicts within the new constitutionalism, as a new legislator, parallel 
and complementary to the parliamentary one35.
33 For example, the notion of EU citizenship ‘is determined by citizenship in the Member States, despite widely 
varying definitions of who is and who may become a citizen’ (2012, 130); and if the Eu citizenship involves 
important legal elements such as the right to property to conclude valid contracts or to take part in elections 
in EU Member States, it does not show its own civic fundamental side: “there are no programmes for social 
provision at the European level. Thus, social rights continue to be claimed at the national level”, C.E. SCHALL, 
Is the Problem of European Citizenship a Problem of Social Citizenship? Social Policy, Federalism, and 
Democracy in the EU and United States, in Sociological Inquiry, vol. 82, 2012, p. 123 ss.
34 Anne Rasmussen highlights the complex role of the Members of the European Parliament strictly linked to 
both national and EU-level parties in her Party soldiers in a non-partisan community? Party linkage in the 
European parliament, in The Role of the political parties in the European Union, in Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2008, p. 1164 ss.
35 C. CRISHAM, K. MORTELMAN, “Observations of Member States in the Preliminary Rulings. Procedure before 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, in D. O’KEEFE D., H.G. SCHERMERS (eds.), Essays in 
European Law and Integration, Boston, Kluwer-Deventer, 1982, p. 43 ss.; P. PORTINARO, “Dal custode della 
costituzione alla costituzione dei custodi”, in G. GOZZI (ed.), Democrazia, diritti, costituzione. I fondamenti 
costituzionali delle democrazie contemporanee, il Mulino, 1997.
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The entrance of the communitarian law on the national territory should 
take place through the application of international law in the light of a certain 
“peculiarity” or a “particular relevance” according to interpretation, the simplest 
tool with which to validate a system of values carried by law across socially 
accepted formats. Over time, the artificial and disconnected law of the new 
spaces has found in constitutional “technique” and economy loyal allies to set 
against the multiplicity of the States and the uniformity of legal discipline. It has 
to be highlighted that, the Italian system is a unified system of civil law (that is, 
of codified statutory law) and the sources of law are mainly written: there are 
several codes (civil, criminal, civil procedure, criminal procedure, etc.) and a 
large number of statutes. Precedent is used but not as a real “source” of law 
because its force is merely persuasive. Until the 1950s, Italian judges interpreted 
the law in conformity to the Constitution as long as it was not in contrast to it, in 
defense of the unity and of the logical coherence of the entire juridical system. 
From the 1970s it was felt that there was a new need to overturn the principles 
of positivism. Judges turned their attention to the private individual, towards the 
recognition and defense of his rights, to compensation for injuries and damage. 
Judicial decisions are not traditionally a source of law in Italy and they are 
supposed to affect only the parties in the case at hand. Italian democracy, heavily 
influenced by the example of France and the writings of French scholarship, has 
regarded legislative supremacy as a fundamental principle.
Consequently, only the legislature, which speaks for the people, is 
supposed to make law. Although the role of judicial precedent in the Italian 
system is not that of a source of law, nor is it a mere virtual authority. Instead, 
drawing strength over time through the interpretive activity of judges, it does not 
have prognostic pretensions and therefore it does not have a definitive character, 
limiting itself to the present. In this way, precedent constitutes an indicator to the 
predictability of the juridical consequences of an act, thus assuring the certainty 
of the law. It is realized in the certainty of the action through the law, in an 
ethical and utilitarian perspective, so as not to reduce it to pure appearance.
The value of the certainty of law and in law indicates the need for the 
individual to be in a position to know the consequences of his own actions so 
as to avoid intervention by the authorities, the arbitrary nature of power which 
identifies itself in the principle of constitutionality. In Italy, uniformity of the court 
decisions comes by the means of living law, meaning the settled interpretation of 
the higher courts and successive adaptation by the lower courts. Since living law 
is the concrete symbol of the evolution of leading case shift, it constitutes one of 
the parameters to which the Court can refer in the evaluation of the constitutional 
legitimacy of a law. Therefore, living law is placed as a representative of a precise 
cultural context but is supported by the element of precedent and, thus, from the 
acts which are “crystallized” through it, it is made concrete. Particular difficulties 
arise in the search for suitable criteria for identifying a sufficiently homogeneous 
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and constant standpoint capable of producing living law. For this purpose, 
precedent plays a fundamental role because it contributes to the concretization 
of living law itself; the nature of precedent is not binding but nevertheless has a 
fundamental role because it can constitute the heart of judicial dialectic. Since the 
decision of a judge is the result of a choice influenced by a surrounding socio-
cultural environment, the existence of a consolidated standpoint constitutes a 
limit to the discretion of the Constitutional Court. It will have to evaluate the 
constitutional legitimacy of a law interpreted according to the standpoint of the 
Courts on the basis of living law. On the other hand, it represents a parameter, a 
value on which the relationship between a decision and the actual exercising of 
jurisdiction is founded.
The judge refers to foreign law in cases characterized by elements of 
internationalization or transnationalization with regard to the Italian system. A 
cross-reference to foreign law can be demanded as a result of adherence to an 
agreement governing uniform law; is a cultural choice made by the judge, a 
voluntary remittal and it is often determined by the need to increase the level of 
persuasion of the decision made. Furthermore, the subject of comparative law is 
often used as a tool to reinforce a final decision. The diffusion of a mixed law, 
both public and private, emerges, arising from the dismissal of public functions, 
the penetration of private law within public law in civil law systems, and the 
split between public and private law in the common law system. Particularly 
with regard to Community law, it is possible to see a process of “hybridization”, 
which is a direct and indirect influence (of the Community law) of the reception 
of foreign experiences. In this sense, the judicial decisions of the Court of Justice 
and of the European Court of Human Rights can be seen as “legal formants” 
which produce “law”, allowing foreign experience to enter the national system 
and, through the support of national living law, to be part of “consolidated law”.
Different agencies, such as the standardization commissions, technical 
regulating agencies and central banks have direct transactions which cut through 
State confines, meaning that the previous division between internal and external 
affairs is less clear in many areas; international treaties have been used to 
synchronize political-legal decisions, a way of increasing global, international, 
regional and socio-legal dynamics; but the most radical change concerns 
national hierarchies replaced by a combination of institutions and treaties in 
which case, inter-dependence is the most appropriate way to describe the 
relationship between States. The practical result of this attempt of coexistence of 
the two spheres (national and supranational) has not led to the disappearance of 
States, nor to the loss of their powers, but to the conviction that they will have 
to operate in a new way and that international cooperation plays an ever greater 
role in government institutions, characterized by new international orders, 
negotiations, competencies, conflict-resolving mechanisms, decentralization 
policies of international cooperation and growing flexibility. This process 
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of denationalization has placed law and authority at a spread level among 
organizations operating at a supranational, transnational and international level, 
while nation-States are part of an interaction and a framework of “superior” 
dynamics. The recognition of the autonomy and authority of Community law, 
immediately applicable and obligatory in domestic legislation, shows the 
existence of a legal space, or rather a law not defined internally, and autonomous 
institutions, unbound from hierarchical relationships, in which order seems to 
simply coincide with the «pure effectiveness of the law»36.
CONCLuSIONS
Writing and reading the Constitution should give an awareness of the 
history of a State and its fundamental principles, (among which even political 
and legal conflicts represent an achievement), the structure and function of the 
text, and the institutions which apply the rules. The theme of revision of the 
Constitution is a central point in the analysis of the text and its relationship with 
time. On one hand, it is linked to a question of legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the regulations, given that it represents the process of written rules; it is also 
linked to the recognition of the authority of “pouvoir constituant” on which the 
whole legitimacy of the Constitution is based. To speak of the revision of the 
Constitution means to wonder about the existence of a set of rules and principles 
which make up a “genetic code”, unrelated to time, and representative of a 
structural limit for amending the constitutional text. The core is made up of 
“eternity clauses”, designed to protect the integrity of the constitutional system, 
the need for stability, certainty and constancy, and also a series of variables 
destined to change over time, adapting to the requirements of the cultural 
context. In other words, the foundation of the Constitution, its very framework, is 
shown to be not only necessary, essential and indivisible, a determining force for 
the safeguard of fundamental rights and for the recognition of the identity of the 
Constitution, but also dynamic. The actual scenario leads to a question: whether 
we are entering a third historical phase of the concept of sovereignty – the first 
being characterized by exclusive territorial control, the second by collective 
self-rule of a multitude through a constitution which constitutes them as a “We 
the people”, and the third by the re-conceptualization of the idea of collective 
self-rule as the capacity of a collective to interact with other communities and 
share with them the control of their life conditions on a global scale, irrespective 
of territorial boundaries37. This indefinite multiplication of sovereignties, where 
the law is fragmented into the “law of peculiarity”, the law of global market 
exchanges produces not only anti-states but also undemocratic effects.
36 N. IRTI, Norma e luoghi, cit., p. 75.
37 U. PREUSS, Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: is Global Constitutionalism a Viable Concept? in 
P. DOBNER; M. LOUGHLIN (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
p. 39; Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship, in European L. Journal, 1995, p. 277 ss.
